Saturday, 14 May 2016

Case Laws on some crucial issues in Departmental Enquiry
Successive proceedings in respect of same matter

 However, after an order passed in an enquiry against a public servant imposing penalty is quashed by a civil Court, a further proceeding can be commenced against him, if in the proceeding in which the order quashing the enquiry was passed, the merits of the charge against the public concerned were never investigated.

Where the High Court decreed the suit of the public servant on the ground that the procedure for imposing penalty was irregular, such a decision cannot prevent the State from commencing another enquiry in respect of the same subject matter consistent with the provision of Article 310 and 311 of the Constitution.

Where the decision of the Court is on technical grounds, re-enquiry into the same charges on the same set of facts, after following correct procedure and affording reasonable opportunity to the employee can be made. •
Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma Vs.State of U.P. (AIR 1962, SC 1334)

 In a case there was an enquiry against the charged officer. He was found guilty on some of the charges. Consequently, he was punished with reversion to the lower rank. Against this reversion order, he filed a writ in the High Court. The High Court quashed the order on the ground that the enquiry was not proper and legal. There upon the charged officer was reinstated in his original post and then put under suspension and fresh proceedings were started on the basis of the same old charges. He was found guilty of some of the charges and was again reverted to a lower rank. He again filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the fresh order of reversion. The High Court dismissed the petition . He then filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that since the earlier order was quashed on technical ground, a second enquiry could be held on merits. – Anand Narain Shukla Vs. State of M.P. (AIR 1979, SC 1923)

Choice between Prosecution & Departmental Action

Mere dropping of the proceedings for prosecution for crime under the penal offence does not take away the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority to take action for misconduct though the material is not sufficient to prove criminal offence which requires strict standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, in appropriate case, the prosecution may chose not to lay charge sheet but it does not take away the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority if there is any evidence on record to the disciplinary action, but there should be misconduct attributable to the delinquent officer. – S. Sree Ram Murthy Vs. C.W.C. (1990(1) SLR AP 21)

Departmental Enquiry – While Police investigation is pending

When a Police investigation is on, consequent upon institution of a criminal case against a public servant, the truth of the same should be ascertained only in an enquiry or trial by the criminal court when a prima facie case is found by the investigation and a chargesheet is submitted. In most cases, it would be proper and reasonable for the Disciplinary Authority to wait for the result of the police investigation and where the investigation is followed by enquiry or trial, the result of such enquiry or trial before deciding to take any disciplinary action against any of its employee. As far as the cases being investigated by the SPE/CBI is concerned, the CVC has issued instruction that once a case has been taken up by the CBI for enquiry or investigation, all the departmental enquiry including the domestic enquiry shall end. Even though this appears to be a reasonable course, which will ordinarily be followed by the Disciplinary Authority, there is not legal bar to the Disciplinary Authority ordering a departmental enquiry even in a case, where a first information report U/s. 154 Cr.PC has been lodged. • B. Balaiah Vs. D.T.O. Karnataka STC (1982 (3) SL, KAR, 675)


 Simultaneous Prosecution as well as Departmental Enquiry

Though ordinarily a departmental action is not initiated in regard to sub-judice matter, yet there is not provision of law which empowers Courts to stay departmental proceedings merely because a criminal prosecution of the same person is launched in a Court of Law. The object of departmental proceeding is to ascertain if the employee is a fit person to be retained in service and the object of the Court trial is to see if the ingredients of the offence have been made out warranting Conviction. In the instant case, a Supreme Court observed that often employers stay enquiries pending decision of the criminal courts and that is fair. But it could not be said that Principles of Natural Justice require that an employer must wait for the decision atleast of the trial Court before taking action against an employee. If the case is of grave nature or involves question of facts or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to wait the decision of the trial court so that the defence of the employee in the criminal court may not be prejudiced.

 – Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. Vs. Kushal Bhan AIR 1960 SC 806 •

In the instant case, the Supreme Court observed that if the criminal trial as well as disciplinary proceedings are based upon the same set of facts, it can be very well said that imputation in the disciplinary proceedings as well as in criminal trial are similar if not identical. It was, therefore, held that the departmental proceedings are liable to be stayed.

 – Kusheshwar Dubey Vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. AIR 1988 SC 2118. •

 In the instant case, the Apex Court has made a distinction between Criminal Trial and Disciplinary Enquiry by hold that, both proceedings ie., the Criminal Trial and Disciplinary Enquiry have different approach, objective, standard of proof, mode of enquiry and rules. In disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the charged official is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment. Whereas in criminal proceedings, the question is whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the suspect is established, and if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him staying of disciplinary proceedings, pending criminal proceeding should not be a matter of course, but a considered decision. Even if, stayed at one stage, the decision may require reconsideration if the criminal trial is unduly delayed.

– State of Rajasthan VS. B.K. Meena, IAS and Ors. (1996) 6 SCC 417 Criminal Prosecution after Departmental Action and vice-versa • At times, in view of the serious nature of the allegation, it may be necessary to initiate criminal proceedings against a public servant even after his dismissal or removal from service in a departmental action. In other words, can a public servant be prosecuted on a charge of bribery or criminal misconduct after his removal from service on the same set of facts? If so, does it contravene the constitutional guarantee as contemplated by Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India? This question was set at rest by the Supreme Court in its judgement in the instant case. It was held that Article 20(2) refers to proceedings before a Court of law for an offence, where there is prosecution and conviction. In a departmental proceeding, there is neither any prosecution nor any conviction by a Court of Law. Therefore, a public servant who has been punished for an official misconduct in a departmental proceeding may still be subjected to a criminal prosecution if the misconduct alleged is also a criminal offence. Thus prohibition as contained in Art. 20(2) of the Constitution in such a case is inoperative. – S.A. Venkataraman Vs. The State 1958 Cr.L.J. 254 SC Departmental Action after Acquittal in a Criminal Case • The question of initiating a departmental action after an acquittal by a Court of Law on the same set of facts is not quite free from difficulty. In case of acquittal with benefit of reasonable doubt, it may be quite permissible to initiate departmental proceedings even on the same set of facts, for it is still a point to be decided by the employer as to whether a person whose character or action is of doubtful nature should or should not be allowed to continue in service. But in the case of honorable acquittal by a Court of Law, it would be wrong to draw up a departmental proceedings on the same set of facts. It has been held by the Supreme Court that normally where the accused is acquitted honorably and completely exonerated of the charge, it would not be expedient to continue a departmental proceeding on the very same charges or ground or evidence. Q.W. Ali Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1959 MP 46 Effect of Order of Acquittal on Departmental Proceedings • In the event of acquittal of the delinquent in a criminal case whether the departmental enquiry pending against him on the same set of facts would continue? It has been observed by the Supreme Court that this is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of finding given by the Criminal Court. Normally, where the accused is acquitted honorably and completely exonerated of the charges, it would not be expedient to continue a departmental enquiry on the same charges or grounds of Evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the concerned authority to continue the departmental enquiry is not taken away nor its discretion in any way fettered. • Corporation of City of Nagpur Vs. Ramachander 1981(2) SLR 274 SC Whether Investigation Report/Preliminary Report etc. should be supplied. • Principles of Natural Justice demands that the copy of a document, if any, relied upon against the party charged should be given to him and he should be afforded opportunity to cross examine the witnesses and to produce his own witness in his defence. If the findings are recorded against the charged employee, placing reliance on a document which might not have been disclosed to him or the copy whereof may not have been supplied to him during the enquiry, when demanded, that would contravene the Principles of Natural Justice rendering the enquiry and the consequential order of punishment illegal and void. If copies of relevant and material documents including the statement of witnesses recorded in the preliminary enquiry or during investigation are not supplied to the delinquent officer facing the enquiry and is such documents are relied upon in holding the charges framed against the delinquent employee, the enquiry would be vitiated for the violation of Principles of Natural Justice. Similarly, if the statement of witnesses recorded during the investigation of a criminal case or in the preliminary enquiry is not supplied to the delinquent officer, that would amount to denial of opportunity of effective cross examination. (CONTINUED next slide) (CONTINUED) • The position of the investigation report or preliminary enquiry report which formed the basis for initiation of departmental enquiry, is somewhat different. The documents of the nature is of an inter-departmental communication, primarily to the holding of enquiry and have no importance unless the enquiry officer wants to rely on them for his own conclusion. Therefore, the charge-sheeted officer is not entitled to the copies of invesigation reports based on which the charges were framed, unless the enquiry officer relied upon those reports. • Krishna Chand Tandon Vs. Union of India, AIR 1974 SC 1589 • In the instant case, a copy of the document as mentioned in the charge sheet, was not supplied to the appellant and he was not permitted to inspect the same. The document, in question, was the report submitted by the Special Police Establishment in respect of the criminal case of theft of coal in which final report had been submitted. After submission of final report in the criminal case, disciplinary enquiry was initiated against ChandramaTiwari. The document was, however, neither considered nor relied upon by the Enquiry Officer in recording findings against the charged official. There is no reference to the document, in question, in the report of the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer has not either referred to nor relied upon that report in recording findings on the charges framed against the delinquent. In this view, the document, in question (the investigation report of SPE) was not a material or relevant document, therefore could not and did not prejudice the delinquent and there was no violation of Principles of Natural Justice. The appellant’s grievance that in absence of Report, he could not cross-examine the Dy.SP of SPE, the Investigating Officer, is not sustainable. The Dy.SP of SPE had been cross examined at length in detail. His Examination-in-chief was confined to one page while the cross examiner runs into six full scape typed pages. The appellant has failed to point out as to how he was prejudiced. The appellant was, thus, not handicapped in cross examining the Dy.SP. His grievance that he was not afforded reasonable opportunity of defence was without any merit. • Chandrama Tiwari Vs. Union of India AIR 1988 SC 117 Assistance to Lawyer whether permissible in Departmental Enquiry • In the instant case, while dealing on the subject “Representation of the accused officer by an advocate in departmental enquiry, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of rules, the assistance of an advocate can be refused if there is not legal complexity in the case. In this case, an Income Tax Officer, who was charged for underassessment with dishonest motive, had only to defend the correctness of the assessment record, he can be said to be the best person to give proper explanation. It was not a case where oral evidence was recorded with reference to accounting. Hence, refusal to permit a lawyer as defence assistance does not violate the Principle of Natural Justice. – Krishna Chandra Tandon Vs. Union of India AIR 1974 SC 1589 • In a case against an officer of All India Khadi and Village Commission investigated by the CBI, Departmental Proceeding for Major Penalty was initiated. An Inspector of CBI was appointed as Presenting Officer, but the request of the charged officer to engage a lawyer to defend his case was rejected. Consequent upon completion of the departmental enquiry, the said officer was punished with reduction to a lower rank. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the CBI Inspector was a legally trained man, with number of domestic enquiries to his credit, where he acted as Presenting Officer. It was further held that the legal practitioner need not be taken in their literal sense. A layman, for that matter a CBI Inspector, would though experience as Presenting Officer in Departmental Enquiries, indeed garner vast legal experience and ability without being a legal practitioner as commonly understood. The ability borne out of vast practical experience in the law and conduct of cases (including DE) is not confined to “Legal Practitioner” as the words are commonly understood. Denial of engaging a “legal practitioner”in this case was held by the High Court to be the denial of reasonable opportunity of defending himself. – Ventaka Raman Sambamurthy Vs. Union of India (1986) II LLJ Bom. 62 • Where in a disciplinary enquiry by a domestic tribunal, the employer appointed two Presenting-cum-Prosecuting officers to present the case on behalf of the management, who were legally trained, denial of a request of the delinquent employee, seeking permission to appear and defend himself by a legal practitioner would vitiate the enquiry on the ground that the delinquent employee had not been afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself, thereby violating one of the essential principles of natural justice. • Board of Trustee of the Port of Bombay Vs. Dilip Kumar Raghvendra Nath Nadkarni, AIR 1983 SC 109 • In the instant case, the employer, Haryana Seeds Development Corporation was represented by its Personnel & Administrative Manager as Presenting Officer during the domestic enquiry. The Supreme Court held that where a delinquent, a non legal person, is pitted against the Presenting Officer, being a person of legal mind and experience, refusal of service of a lawyer to the delinquent amounts to denial of natural justice. – J.K. Aggarwal Vs. Haryana Seeds Development Corp. Ltd.AIR 1991 SC 1221 Penalty to be commensurate with Misconduct Alleged • The punishment must be commensurate with the misconduct alleged. The punishment of dismissal should be imposed only in cases of grave misconduct and continuing of which indicates the incorrigibility and complete unfitness for holding a public office. The temporary misappropriation of utensils from the mess was held to be not so grave a misconduct to award the punishment of dismissal and that the punishment of dismissal under the circumstances is too severe and not commensurate with the misconduct. – Sukhbir Singh Vs. Dy. Commissioner of Police, New Delhi 1984(2) SLR 149 Del. • A Cash Clerk of the Delhi Milk Supply Scheme Department, under the administrative control of Govt. of India was prosecuted for having committed criminal breach of trust in respect of a sum of Rs. 500/-. He repaid that amount and pleaded guilty to the charge. The trying Magistrate convicted him u/s. 409 IPC but in view of the peculiar circumstances relating to the crime and the criminal, he released him under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. As a result of the conviction, the said Clerk was dismissed from service summarily. In this case, the Supreme Court observed that Clause(a) of the 2nd Proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution confers on the Government, the power to dismiss a person from service “on the ground of conduct which had led to his conviction on a criminal charge”. However, the power like every other power has to be exercised fairly. But the right to impose a penalty carries with it the duty to act justly. The Supreme Court termed the penalty of dismissal from service imposed upon the delinquent clerk as whimsical. Shankar Das Vs. Union of India and Ors. AIR 1985 SC 772 • Two persons were working as Plant Operator on the intervening night of 5th and 6th May, 1982. They were on duty in the night shift. At about 3.30 A.M., when the plant-incharge made a surprise visit, he found the two operators sleeping, though the machine was kept working. For the said misconduct, a domestic enquiry was held after following the due procedure. After the domestic enquiry, both the operators were dismissed from service. When the matter came up before the Supreme Court on an application filed by the employer company, the Supreme Court observed that punishment for dismissal for minor misconduct or misconduct of technical nature is shockingly disproportionate punishment and ordered for reinstatement of the two dismissed operators. – Colour Chem Ltd. Vs. A.L. Alaspurkar & Ors. 1998 (1) SLR 757 Whether delinquent is entitled to the copy of the Inquiry Officer’s Report. • It has also been held by the Supreme Court in the instant case that the delinquent officer is entitled to the Inquiry Report only when the inquiry was conducted by an Inquiry Officer. But when the inquiry is conducted by the Disciplinary Authority himself, the delinquent is not entitled to have the inquiry report, as there is no inquiry report on account of the fact that the disciplinary authority is himself the Inquiry Officer. – Union of India and Ors. Vs. Md. Ramzan Kah AIR 1991 SC 471 Government Servants convicted by Trial Court – Appeal Pending in Appellate Court – Can dismissal proceedings be initiated. • The Supreme Court has also held that to wait for the action suggested above till the appeal, revision, and other remedies are over, would not be advisable since it would mean continuing in service of a person who has been convicted of a serious offence by a Criminal Court. – Dy. Director of Collegiate Education (Admn.) Vs. S. Nagoor Meera, AIR 1995 SC 1362 • Joint Enquiry : A joint enquiry can be conducted in departmental proceedings. – Balbir Chand Vs. Food Corp. of India (1997) SLR 756 SC • Law Officer : Officer of Law Officers is a post in connection with the affairs of the State but from that it does not follow that it is post in a State service. – Andhra Pradesh BCS etc. Associate Vs. The Seretary to Govt., Law Deptt. (1988) 4 SLR 119 (AP) • Presiding Officer being a witness : If the Presiding Officerat a departmental enquiry is also a witness, and there is no other witness, natural justice is violated and the dismissal as a result of such inquiry has to be set aside. – M.K. Keshava Vs. Dy. Commissioner (!984) 2 SLR 278 • Legal Assistance : Bank was represented by a legally trained person though he was an officer of the bank. Denial of permission to the petitioner to engage a counsel in the enquiry was held to be violation of the principles of natural justice. – N.K. Sareen Vs. PNB (1995) SLR 144 Delhi Syed Rahimuddin V/s Director General, CSIR and others (AIR, 2001, SC 2418) • Constitution of India, Art. 311 – Disciplinary enquiry – Natural justice – compliance – non-production of certain documents by Deptt. Despite order by enquiry officer for their production – Delinquent participating in inquiry and cross-examining departmental witnesses without raising grievance about non-production of documents – Grievance made subsequently held to be dilatory tactic by Enquiry Officer – Enquiry cannot be said to be vitiated by nonproduction of documents even though production of documents even though they were ordered to be produced by enquiry officer. Syed Rahimuddin V/s Director General, CSIR and others (AIR, 2001, SC 2418) --- (Contd .) • An order of compulsory retirement in a departmental proceeding under the provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules is the subject matter of challenges in the appeal. Against the delinquent-respondent in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the CCS Rules a set of charges have been levelled. He was called upon to answer those charges in a regular inquiry. Before the Enquiring Officer the delinquent prayed for production of certain documents and in fact, an order was passed by the Enquiring Officer directing the department authorities to give copies of those documents to the delinquent. But, notwithstanding the same the allegation of the delinquent is that some of those documents had not been produced. Ultimately, on the basis of the materials produced, the Enquiring Officer came to the conclsuion that the charges against the delinquent have been proved by the departmental authorities. On the basis of the said report of the Enquiring Officer, the disciplinary authority imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement after coming to the conclusion that the charges against the delinquent must be said to have been established beyond doubt. The delinquent then preferred an appeal before the appellate authority, but the same having been dismissed, he approached the CAT, Hyderabad. The Tribunal by the impugned order came to the conclusion that there has been no invalidity in the inquiry proceeding nor can it be said that there has been an violation of principles of natural justice and, therefore, the order of punishment cannot be interfered with. The Tribunal having dismissed the application filed by the delinquent, he is in appeal before this Court. Syed Rahimuddin V/s Director General, CSIR and others (AIR, 2001, SC 2418) --- (Contd .) • We have considered each of te contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, but we do not find any subs4tance in any one of them. It is, no doubt, true that the delinquent had made an application for production of certain documents and the Enquiring Officer did pass an order for production of those documents. It also transpires that some of those documents were produced any yet some of them had not been produced. When a grievance was made on the score before the E.O. by filing a representation of 3rd August, 1989, the said E.O. considered the said grievance and came to the conclusion that the very fact that though the inquiry continued from 2-7-89 to 6-7- 89 and the delinquent had been cross examining the departmental witnesses, yet no grievance had been made on the score of non-production of any of those vital documents which, according to the deliqnent, could have established the defence case. The E.O. came to the conclusion that the so-called representation D/ -3 rd of August, 1989 making a grievance is a dilly dally tactics on the part of the charged officer and the sole intention was to stall the inquiry by any means. In view of the aforesaid conclusion of the E.O. in its order disposing of the grievance made on 3-8-89 we do not find any substance in the argument of the learned counsel that in fact the delinquent was really prejudiced by non-supply of some of the so-called vital documents though for productiuon of the same the E.O. had ordered. The Tribunal, therefore, rightly came to the conclusion that such alleged non-production cannot be held to be a denial of reasonable opportunity to the delinquent in making his defence. Sher Bahadur Vs. Union of India and others. (AIR 2002 SC 3030) • Where a casual worker, a khalasi was dismissed for misconduct under R.6(vii) to (ix) of Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal Rules) Rules (1986), the mere fact that the enquiry officer has noted in his report ‘in view of oral, documentary and circumstantial evidence as adduced in the enquiry”, would not in principle satisfy the rule of sufficiency of evidence’ postulates existence of some evidence which links the charged officer with the misconduct alleged against him. Evidence, however, voluminous it may be, which is neither relevant in a broad sense nor establishes any nexus between the alleged misconduct and the charged officer, is no evidence in law. Hence when in the instant case though Disciplinary Authority cited one witness in support of charges, he was not examined; the documentary evidence referred to in the enquiry report was only the order of appointment of the employee which is a neutral fact, and the |E.O. examined the charged officer but nothing is elicited to connect him with the charge; the present case is clearly a case of finding the employee guilty of charge without having any evidence to link the employee with the alleged misconduct. • 2001 All LJ 2253, Reversed Sher Bahadur Vs. Union of India and others. (AIR 2002 SC 3030) • However, as regards relief, the Supreme Court observed that in as much as the concerned employee being casual worker (khalasi) who was in service for only two years before his dismiss and it is more than a decade that he has been out of service, in the circumstances, it is not a fit case to direct his reinstatement. Instead interests of justice would be met by directing Railway Authorities to pay him compensation equal to average salary for a period of two years within two months. Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & anothers (AIR 1999 SC 1416) • (A) Constitution of India, Arts. 21, 309 – Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (1965), R.10 – Fundamental Rules, R.53 – Subsistence allowance – Non-payment of, during suspension period – Violative of fundamental right to life – Penury occasioned by non-payment of subsistance allowance – Employee unable to undertake journey to attend departmental proceeding – Departmental proceedings stand vitiated. Contd.. • Constitution of India, Art. 311 – Departmental proceedings and criminal case – Based on identical set of facts – Evidence in both proceedings common – Employee acquitted in criminal case – Said order of acquittal can conclude departmental proceedings – Order of dismissal already passed before decision of criminal case liable to be set aside. Sardar Prakash Singh Badar Vs. V.K. Khanna and others (AIR 2001 SC 343) • (A) Administrative Law – Bias – Test to set aside administrative action – There must be real danger of bias and not mere apprehension. • (B)Administrative Law – Admissitrative action – Judicial review – Appointment of officers of Administrative service to high posts – Assessment of suitability and efficiency – Best judge would be people’s representatives – Not Court. • © Administrative Law – Mala fide action – Definite evidence of mala fide is necessary – Action not otherwise bona fide does not by iteslf becomes mala fide. Contd.. • (E) Constitution of India, Art. 311 – Disciplinary enquiry – Interference at stage of isuance of charge sheet – Permissible if element of malice or mala fide is involved in issuance of charge sheet. • (F) Constitution of India, Art. 311 – Disciplinary enquiry – Bias of disciplinary authority – Announcement of inquiry officer even before receipt of reply of delinquent employee to charge sheet – Shows bias. Contd. • Soon after the issuance of the charge sheet however, the Press reported a statement of the Chief Minister on 27th April, 1997 that a Judge of the High Court would look into the charges against Shri V.K. Khanna – this statement has been ascribed to the mala fide by Mr. Subramaniam by reason of the fact that even prior to the expiry of the period pertaining to the submission of reply to the charge-sheet, this announcement was effected that a Judge of the High Court would look into the charges against the respondent No. 1 – Mr. Subramaniam contended that the statement depicts malice and vendetta and the frame of mind so as to humiliate the former Chief Secretary. The time has not expired for assessment of the situation as to whether there is any misconduct involved – if any credence is to be attached to the Press report, we are afraid Mr. Subramaniam’s comment might find some justification. State of Gujarat Vs. Emedbhai M. Patel (AIR 2001 SC 1109) • Constitution of India, Art. 311 – Compulsory retirement – Principle governming – enumerated. • Constitution of India, Art. 311 – Compulsory retirement – Order passed against employee against whom disciplinary enquiry was initiated and who was under suspension – There were no addverse entries in employee’s confidential record – Employee had successfully crossed efficiency bar at age of 50 as well as 55 – Had only less than two years to retire from service – Held order of compulsory retirement was passed for extraneous reasons – Liable to be set aside. Deokinandan Sharma Vs. Union of India and others (AIR 2001 SC 1767) • The short facts are that the appelllant joined the service in the State Bank of India in its Khura Branch in the district of Bulandshahar UU.P.) as money tester on 26.5.1964 and was duly confirmed on the said post. Thereafter, he was promoted as officer grade.II and transferred to Agra in the year 1975 and later on in the year 1977 he was shifted to Faridabad Branch of the bank and posted there as Officer-in-charge of the extension counter, Sewa Samiti, whch counter was to handle transactions relating to deposit accounts, outward remittance and issues and encashment of rupees travellers cheques only with one man handling. On 13.10.80 one Shri K.C. Batra, Circle Auditor inspector the accounts of the said extension counter and found serious financial irregularities therein and reported the matter to Circle Vigilance Officer whereupon the appellant was suspended from the service of the bank when the departmental proceeding was under contemplation. Subsequently, on 21.1.1983, a charge sheet was issued against the appellant framing the following charges in the departmental proceedings :- Deokinandan Sharma Vs. Union of India and others (AIR 2001 SC 1767) – contd. • (i) That the petitioner purchased cheques from traders for substantial amounts without ascertaining genuineness of transactions in excess of Rs. 10,000/-. • (ii) That the petitioner allowed overdrafts to various parties unauthorisedly in excess of Rs. 10,000/-. • (iii)That the petitioner paid cheques/passed debits relating to crtain accounts without positing them/stiking balance in the ledger, thus concealing the overdrafts. • (iv) That the petitioner afforded credits to parties by debit to suspense account in anticipation of realisation of cheques in clearing of SCS, in excess of Rs. 10,000. Deokinandan Sharma Vs. Union of India and others (AIR 2001 SC 1767) – contd. • (v) That the petitioner passed fictitious credits to parties and transferred funds from one account to another and reversed such entries subsequently with a view to conceal the overdrafts. • (vi) That the petitioner passed debits to various accounts without authority from the account holders in excess of Rs. 10,000/-. • (vii) A shortage of rs. 100/- in cash balance was detected at the extension counter during a surprise verification on 13-10-1980. Deokinandan Sharma Vs. Union of India and others (AIR 2001 SC 1767) – contd. • Statement Bank of India Act (23 of 1955), S. 49 – State Bank of India Supervising Staff (Service) Rules (1975), R. 49(g) – Disciplinary enquiry – Evidence – Examination of witness on behalf of bank, completed – List of witnesses filed by defence – Dates fixed for their examination – On that date however, neither defence representive appeared nor single witness produced on behalf of defence – Case adjourned – On adjourned date also neither any defence representative appeared nor any defence witness produced – Report submitted by conducting officer as in spite of full opportunity was afforded to defence, no witness was examined – Held, that reasonable opportunity was afforded to the delinquent to adduce evidence during the course of enquiry. State of U.P. Vs. Harendra Arora and another (AIR 2001 SC 2319) • Constitution of India, Arts. 309, 311(2) – Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (1930) (as amended and substituted by U.P. Ahendment) R. 55-A – Dismissal of Govt. Servant – Requirement of furnishing copy of enquiry report to delinquent employee though obligatory on employer as per R. 55-A – Non-furnishing of enquiry report, does not invalidate dismissal order unless prejudice is shown to have been caused to delinquent employee. State of U.P. Vs. Harendra Arora and another (AIR 2001 SC 2319) • Respondent Harendra Arora who was temporarily appointed in the year 1960 as Asstt. Engineer in the Irrigation Department of the U.P. Govt., was confirmed on the said post and in the year 1963 he was remitted as Executive Engineer. On 31-3-1970 the respondent was served with a charge sheet by the Administrative Tribunal incorporating therein various irregularities committed by him with regard to the purchase of goods while he was posted as Executive Engineer at the concerned station, requiring him to submit his explanation relating thereto which was duly submitted. Upon receipt of the show cause, full-fledged enquiry was conducted whereafter the Administrative Tribunal submitted its report to the State Government recording a finding therein that the charge was substantiated and recommending dismissal of the respondent from service, upon receipt of which the State Govt. Issued a show cause to the respondent as to why he be not dismissed from Service. Pursuant to the said notice, the respondent submitted his reply to the show cause notice whereupon the Contd.. The Statement Govt. sent the reply to the Administrative Tribunal for its comments and upon receipt of the same, order was passed on 13.3.1973 dismissing the respondent from service which order was challenged by the respondent before the High Court by filing a writ application and the same having abated in view of the coming into force of the U.P. State Public Services Tribunal Act, 1976, a claim petition was filed by the respondent before the U.P. State Public Service. Tribunal challenging his aforesaid order of dismissal. The Tribunal allowed the claim petition and quashed the order of dismissal principally on the ground that copy of the enquiry report, as required under Rule 550A of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1930, as amended by the Govt. of Uttar Pradesh, was not furnished to the delinquent against which order when a writ application was filed on behalf of the State, a Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the same upholding order of the Tribunal . Hence this appeal by special leave. Contd…

Monday, 9 May 2016

10 May 2016 Supreme Court High Court Updates

SC on NEET Row: States Can't Hold Separate Medical Entrance Exam
Supreme Court has ruled that National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET) would be the only test for admission to medical courses in India, turning down an appeal by many States to hold separate medical entrance exams.
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SC Agrees to Allow Diesel Taxis with All-India Permit to Carry BPO Employees in Delhi, NCR
SC has agreed to relax its order banning diesel-run all-India tourist permit taxis which ferry BPO employees in Delhi and NCR.
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SC Seeks Response of Finance Ministry, RBI & SEBI on Panama Plea
SC has sought response from Finance Ministry, RBI and SEBI on a plea seeking a CBI probe against those named in the Panama papers.
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Bombay HC Stops a Lounge Bar in Belgaum from Using Name "Blu Frog"
Bombay HC restrained operation of lounge bar named "Blu Frog" at a Mall in Belgaum under that name and logo, stating that that merely dropping letter 'e' does not take away from the fact that it is tapping in on the credentials of legendary nightclub "Blue Frog".
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Punjab and Haryana HC: Born Abroad, You Can Get Property Vacated in Punjab
Punjab and Haryana HC has held that a foreign citizen or a person born outside India on return could get his properties vacated in Punjab.
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Madras HC's Directive on Police Seizure of Jewels
Madras HC, while disposing of a writ petition filed by the manager of Muthoot Finance, has said enterprises offering loans against gold jewellery always run risk of accepting stolen articles and therefore they cannot question the power of police to seize jewels in appropriate cases.
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Government Passes Uttarakhand Budget Bill in Lok Sabha
Uttarakhand Budget and Appropriation Bill has been passed in the Lok Sabha, justifying the move on the grounds that it was a "constitutional necessity" as the State was under President's rule and funds had to be sanctioned immediately.
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Gilead Books Patent for Hepatitis C Drug Solvadi
Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trademark has granted American pharmaceutical company Gilead Sciences the patent for the blockbuster Hepatitis C drug Sofosbuvir (brand name Sovaldi) in India.
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TVS Gets Patent for Air-Injection System to Improve Fuel Economy
TVS Motor has secured a patent for an invention relating to an air-injection system operative during deceleration of an automobile engine.
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Facebook Wins Trademark Case in China
Facebook has won its trademark in China with a Beijing Court ruling against a Chinese firm to use the famous name for its beverage, providing a rare trademark victory for the U.S. social networking giant in the Communist nation.
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NCDRC Imposes Penalty on Jaypee Group
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) has ordered Jaypee Group to pay 12% annual penalty to home buyers in Kalypso Court project in Noida.

Cancellation of Contract-Security Deposit - Forfeiture for default

    The law is well settled that the party to a contract taking security deposit from the other party to ensure due performance of the contract is not entitled to forfeit the deposit on ground of default when no loss is caused to it in consequence of such default."
     in Union of India v. Rampur Distillery and Chemical Co. Ltd. [(1973) 1 SCC 649], this Court stated :
      3. Only one contention was urged on behalf of the appellants before us : that the security deposit was taken from the respondents in order to ensure the due performance of the contract and respondents having defaulted, the entire amount was liable to be forfeited. A similar contention was advanced before this Court but was rejected inMaula Bux v. Union of India.The appellant therein had entered into a contract with the Government of India for the supply of certain goods and had deposited a certain amount of security for the due performance of the contract . As in the instant case, it was stipulated in the contract there that the amount of security deposit was to stand forfeited in case the appellant neglected to perform his part of the contract. On the appellant committing default in the supply, the Government rescinded thecontract and forfeited the security deposit . It was held by this Court that forfeiture of earnest money under a contract for sale of property does not fall within Section 70 of the Contract Act, if the amount is reasonable, because the forfeiture of a reasonable sum paid as earnest money does not amount to the imposition of a penalty. But, where under the terms of the contract the party in breach has undertaken to pay a sum of money or to forfeit a sum of money which he has already paid to the party complaining of a breach of contract , the undertaking is of the nature of a penalty". It was further held that the amount deposited by way of security for guaranteeing the due performance of the contract cannot be regarded as earnest money."
    The distinction between a security and an earnest money has also been pointed out by this Court in Maula Bux v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 554] in the following terms :
      4. Under the terms of the agreements the amounts deposited by the plaintiff as security for due performance of the contracts were to stand forfeited in case the plaintiff neglected to perform his part of the contract . The High Court observed that the deposits so made may be regarded as earnest money. But that view cannot be accepted. According to Earl Jowitt in Dictionary of English Law at p. 689; Giving an earnest or earnest-money is a mode of signifying assent to a contract of sale or the like, by giving to the vendor a nominal sum (e.g. a shilling) as a token that the parties are in earnest or have made up their minds". As observed by the Judicial Committee in Kunwar Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup :
      Earnest money is part of the purchase price when the transaction goes forward; it is forfeited when the transaction falls through, by reason of the fault or failure of the vendee."
      In the present case the deposit was made not of a sum of money by the purchaser to be applied towards part payment of the price when the contract was completed and till then as evidencing an intention on the part of the purchaser to buy property or goods. Here the plaintiff had deposited the amounts claimed as security for guaranteeing due performance of the contracts . Such deposits cannot be regarded as earnest money."
    Referring to Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act, it was observed :
      There is authority, no doubt coloured by the view which was taken in English cases, that Section 74 of the Contract Act has no application to cases of deposit for due performance of a contract which is stipulated to be forfeited for breach, Natesa Aiyar v. Appayu PadayachiSinger Manufacturing Company v. Raja Prosad;Manian Pattar v. Madras Railway Company. But this view is no longer good law in view of the judgment of this Court in Fateh Chand case. This Court observed at p. 526 : AIR 1915 Madras 896 (FB)
      Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act deals with the measure of damages in two classes of cases : (i) where the contract names a sum to be paid in case of breach, and (ii) where the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty.........., The measure of damages in the case of breach of a stipulation by way of penalty is by Section 74, reasonable compensation not exceeding the penalty stipulated for. "
    The Court also observed :
      It was urged that the section deals in terms with the right to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation and not the right to forfeit what has already been received by the party aggrieved. There is however no warrant for the assumption made by some of the High Courts in India, that Section 74, applies only to cases where the aggrieved party is seeking to receive some amount on breach of contract and not to cases whereupon breach of contract an amount received under the contract is sought to be forfeited. In our judgment the expression the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty" comprehensively applies to every covenant involving a penalty whether it is for payment on breach of contract of money or delivery of property in future, or for forfeiture of right to money or other property already delivered. Duty not to enforce the penalty clause but only to award reasonable compensation is statutorily imposed upon courts by Section 74. In all cases, therefore, where there is a stipulation in the nature of penalty for forfeiture of an amount deposited pursuant to the terms of contract which expressly provides forforfeiture , the court has jurisdiction to award such sum only as it considers reasonable, but not exceeding the amount specified in the contract as liable to forfeiture , and that, There is no ground for holding that the expression contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty is limited to cases of stipulation in the nature of an agreement to pay money or deliver property on breach and does not comprehend covenants under which amounts paid or property delivered under the contract , which by the terms of the contract expressly or by clear implication are liable to be forfeited."
    A decision reported in State of Gujarat v. Dahyabhai Zaverbhai, (AIR 1997 SC 2701). wherein, it was held under Section 74 of the Contract Act-
      "When there was abandonment of a contract forfeiture of the security deposit as per clause of the contract is not illegal".
    Decision reported in Managing Director M/s. Hindustan Shipyard Private Ltd. Visakhapatnam, v. Attili Appalaswami, ( AIR 1963 Andhra Pradesh 71). Therefore, according to him, the plaintiff is not entitled for any amount. In this connection, it is useful to refer to Section 74 of the Contract Act.
      74. Compensation for breach of contract where penalty stipulated for:- When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for".
     It is useful to refer to the decision reported in Fateh Chand, v. Balkishan Dass, (AIR 1963 SC 1405), wherein it has been specifically held in Para Nos. 8 and 10, as follows:
      "8. The Section is clearly an attempt to eliminate the somewhat elaborate refinements made under the English common law in distinguishing between stipulations providing for payment of liquidated damages and stipulations in the nature of penalty. Under the common law a genuine pre-estimate of damages by mutual agreement is regarded as a stipulation naming liquidated damages and binding between the parties: a stipulation in a contract in terrorem is a penalty and the Court refuses to enforce it, awarding to the aggrieved party only reasonable compensation. The Indian Legislature has sought to cut across the web of rules and presumptions under the English common law, by enacting a uniform principle applicable to all stipulations naming amounts to be paid in case of breach, and stipulations by way of penalty.
       Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act deals with the measure of damages in two classes of cases (i) where the contract names a sum to be paid in case of breach and (ii) where the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty. We are in the present case not concerned to decide whether a contract containing a covenant offorfeiture of deposit for due performance of a contract falls within the first class. The measure of damages in the case of breach of a stipulation by way of penalty is by Section 74 reasonable compensation not exceeding the penalty stipulated for. In assessing damages the Court has, subject to the limit of the penalty stipulated, jurisdiction to award such compensation as it deems reasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Jurisdiction of the Court to award compensation in case of breach of contract is unqualified except as to the maximum stipulated; but compensation has to be reasonable, and that imposes upon the Court duty to award compensation according to settled principles. The section undoubtedly says that the aggrieved party is entitled to receive compensation from the party who has broken the contract whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused by the breach. Thereby it merely dispenses with proof of "actual loss or damage"; it does not justify the award of compensation when in consequence of the breach no legal injury at all has resulted because compensation for breach of contract can be awarded to make good loss or damage which naturally arose in the usual course of things, or which the parties knew when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach".
     In fact, the same view has been reinforced in the decision reported in Maula Bux v. Union of India, (AIR 1970 SC 1955).
    Both the above decisions clearly lays down that when an amount of compensation was fixed either as security deposit or liquidated damages, consequent on the breach, it is not mandatory that the entire amount has to be forfeited and the Court can consider as to what is the actual loss and the quantum of compensation the party will be entitled to. The above decisions have been reiterated in recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in Ashokan v. CCE[5], wherein the power of the Court to grant reasonable compensation even inspite of stipulated liquidated damages were recognized.

Sunday, 8 May 2016

Role power of attorney to give evidence or to depose -Law in CPC,CrPC and NI Act

Whether, a power of attorney can speak about a fact, which is in the personal knowledge of the petitioner
In 
Nandhini vs M/S.Vinayaga Textiles on 27 March, 2015    Madras High Court referred a number of Apex Court and Other High court Judgments to settle the law on issue
In Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and another vs. Indusind Bank Limited and others reported in 2005 (3) MLJ 109, the Supreme Court in paragraph 12, held as follows :
12. O.3, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C., empowers the holder of power of attorney to "act" on behalf of the principal. In our view the word "acts" employed in O.3, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C., confines only in respect of "acts" done by the power of attorney holder in exercise of power granted by the instrument. The term "acts" would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power of attorney holder has rendered some "acts" in pursuance to power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not by him. Similarly he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined.
(ii) In R.Arjunan v. Arunachala Gounder reported in 2007 (5) CTC 133 = 2006 (4) LW 520, I have held that in respect of acts committed with the personal knowledge, Power of Attorney cannot speak on behalf of the Principal. Therefore, I opined that it is not permissible to permit the Power of Attorney to represent the Principal to appear and adduce evidence, in respect of acts, which the Principal had personal knowledge of the same.
(iii) In Shankar Finance & Investments vs. State of AP reported in (2008) 8 SCC 536 = AIR 2009 SC 422, the Supreme Court, while explaining, in what circumstances, the evidence of an attorney holder would be relevant and while dealing with a complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 signed by the attorney holder of the payee, held as follows:
A power of attorney holder of the complainant, who does not have personal knowledge, cannot be examined. But where the attorney holder of the complainant is in charge of the business of the complainant and the attorney holder alone is personally aware of the transactions, and the complaint is signed by the attorney holder on behalf of the complainant payee, there is no reason why the attorney holder cannot be examined as the complainant..... In regard to business transactions of companies, partnerships or proprietary concerns, many a time the authorized agent or attorney holder may be the only person having personal knowledge of the particular transaction; and if the authorized agent or attorney-holder has signed the complaint, it will be absurd to say that he should not be examined under section 200 of the Code, and only the Secretary of the company or the partner of the firm or the proprietor of a concern, who did not have personal knowledge of the transaction, should be examined."
(iv) In Man Kaur (Dead) v. Hartar Singh Sangha reported in 2010 (10) SCC 512, at Paragraph 12, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
12. We may now summarise for convenience, the position as to who should give evidence in regard to matters involving personal knowledge:
(a) An attorney holder who has signed the plaint and instituted the suit, but has no personal knowledge of the transaction can only give formal evidence about the validity of the power of attorney and the filing of the suit.
(b) If the attorney holder has done any act or handled any transactions, in pursuance of the power of attorney granted by the principal, he may be examined as a witness to prove those acts or transactions. If the attorney holder alone has personal knowledge of such acts and transactions and not the principal, the attorney holder shall be examined, if those acts and transactions have to be proved.
(c) The attorney holder cannot depose or give evidence in place of his principal for the acts done by the principal or transactions or dealings of the principal, of which principal alone has personal knowledge.
(d) Where the principal at no point of time had personally handled or dealt with or participated in the transaction and has no personal knowledge of the transaction, and where the entire transaction has been handled by an attorney holder, necessarily the attorney holder alone can give evidence in regard to the transaction. This frequently happens in case of principals carrying on business through authorized managers/attorney holders or persons residing abroad managing their affairs through their attorney holders.
(e) Where the entire transaction has been conducted through a particular attorney holder, the principal has to examine that attorney holder to prove the transaction, and not a different or subsequent attorney holder.
(f) Where different attorney holders had dealt with the matter at different stages of the transaction, if evidence has to be led as to what transpired at those different stages, all the attorney holders will have to be examined.
(g) Where the law requires or contemplated the plaintiff or other party to a proceeding, to establish or prove something with reference to his `state of mind' or `conduct', normally the person concerned alone has to give evidence and not an attorney holder. A landlord who seeks eviction of his tenant, on the ground of his `bona fide' need and a purchaser seeking specific performance who has to show his `readiness and willingness' fall under this category. There is however a recognized exception to this requirement. Where all the affairs of a party are completely managed, transacted and looked after by an attorney (who may happen to be a close family member), it may be possible to accept the evidence of such attorney even with reference to bona fides or `readiness and willingness'. Examples of such attorney holders are a husband/wife exclusively managing the affairs of his/her spouse, a son/daughter exclusively managing the affairs of an old and infirm parent, a father/mother exclusively managing the affairs of a son/daughter living abroad.
(v) In Mukesh Aggarwal v. Rajinder Kumar Pahwa and another reported in 2012(1) RCR (Criminal) 179 (P&H), the Punjab and Haryana High Court, held as follows:
The settled law is that the complaint may not essentially be required to be filed by the complainant himself, but complainant certainly has to step into the witness box to prove the allegations levelled against the accused. No doubt, the power of attorney could appear in the witness box, yet his testimony could be appreciated to a limited extent i.e. qua the facts within his personal knowledge. It has been observed by Hon'ble Kerala High Court in case Anirudhan Vs. Phillip Jacob, 2006 (4) Criminal Court Cases 130 (Kerala) that power of attorney holder is competent to speak of facts within his exclusive personal knowledge. Similarly, it was observed by Hon'ble Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Mahendra Kumar Vs. Armstrong & another, 2005 (3) Civil Court Cases 75 that if the attorney has appeared as a witness at the stage of taking cognizance, his testimony could be considered for the purposes of registration of the complaint/issuance of process under Section 204 Cr.P.C., but for further proceeding, examination of the complainant is a must. In another case titled as M/s G.I. Packaging Private Ltd. and another Vs. M/s S.S. Sales and another, 2006 (2) S.L.J. (Bombay) 900, the Hon'ble Bombay High Court has observed that power of attorney cannot depose on behalf of the complainant, but he can appear as a witness on behalf of the complainant and depose about the facts in his personal knowledge. It is also well settled by now that if the party, bound to appear to prove the allegations, does not enter into the witness box, then the inference would be drawn that the plea set up by him is not correct.
(vi) In S.Kesari Hanuman Goud v. Anjum Jehan reported in 2013 (12) SCC 64, the Supreme Court held as follows:
13. It is a settled legal proposition that the power of attorney holder cannot depose in place of the principal. Provisions of Order III, Rules 1 and 2 CPC empower the holder of the power of attorney to act on behalf of the principal. The word acts employed therein is confined only to acts done by the power-of-attorney holder, in exercise of the power granted to him by virtue of the instrument. The term acts , would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power-of-attorney holder has preferred any acts in pursuance of the power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for acts done by the principal, and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of a matter, as regards which, only the principal can have personal knowledge and in respect of which, the principal is entitled to be cross-examined. (See: Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr., AIR 1999 SC 1441;Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani and another vs. Indusind Bank Limited and others, (2005) 2 SCC 217;Shankar Finance & Investments vs. State of AP, AIR 2009 SC 422; andMan Kaur (Dead) v. Hartar Singh Sangha (2010) 10 SCC 512).
(vii) In A.C.Narayanan v. State of Maharastra reported in 2013 (11) SCALE 360, the Supreme Court, on reference, framed the question, as follows:
(i) Whether a Power of Attorney holder can sign and file a complaint petition on behalf of the complainant?/ Whether the eligibility criteria prescribed by Section 142(a) of NI Act would stand satisfied if the complaint petition itself is filed in the name of the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque?
(ii) Whether a Power of Attorney holder can be verified on oath under Section 200 of the Code?
(iii) Whether specific averments as to the knowledge of the Power of Attorney holder in the impugned transaction must be explicitly asserted in the complaint?
(iv) If the Power of Attorney holder fails to assert explicitly his knowledge in the complaint then can the Power of Attorney holder verify the complaint on oath on such presumption of knowledge?
(v) Whether the proceedings contemplated under Section 200 of the Code can be dispensed with in the light of Section 145 of the N.I. Act which was introduced by an amendment in the year 2002? While considering the above issues and different opinion of the Courts, the Apex Court, discussed as hereunder, 16) In order to find out the answers to the above and also to ascertain whether there is any conflict between the two decisions as pointed out in the referral order, let us consider the factual details and the ultimate dictum laid down in both the decisions.
17) In MMTC (supra), the appellant is a Government of India company. Respondent No. 1 therein is also a company and Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were the Directors of the respondent-Company. The appellant-Company and the respondent-Company entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated 01.06.1994 and the same was slightly altered on 19.09.1994. Pursuant to the MoU, two cheques were issued by the respondent-Company in favour of the appellant-Company. When both the cheques were presented for payment, the same got returned with an endorsement payment stopped by drawer . Two notices were served by the appellant-Company on the respondent-Company. As the amounts under the cheques were not paid, the appellant-Company lodged two complaints through one Lakshman Goel, the Manager of the Regional Office (RO) of the appellant-Company. Respondents therein also filed two petitions for quashing of the complaints. By the impugned order, both the complaints were quashed. In the said case as well as in the cases filed subsequently, the respondents took identical contentions in their petitions in order to quash the complaints, viz., that the complaints filed by Mr Lakshman Goel were not maintainable and that the cheques were not given for any debt or liability. In the impugned judgment, it was held that the complaints filed by Mr Lakshman Goel were not maintainable. The High Court held that it is only an Executive Director of the Company who has the authority to institute legal proceedings. While holding that the reasoning given by the High Court cannot be sustained, this Court held that Section 142 of the N.I. Act provides that a complaint under Section 138 can be made by the payee or the holder in due course of the said cheque. This Court further held that the complaints in question were by the appellant-company who is the payee of the two cheques. After finding that the Court cannot quash a complaint as stated by the High Court, this Court set aside the same and directed the trial Court to proceed with the complaints against Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 therein in accordance with law.
18) Now, let us consider the later decision of this Court in Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra). This case relates to powers of Power of Attorney under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and it was concluded that a complaint by a power of attorney holder on behalf of original plaintiff is maintainable provided he has personal knowledge of the transaction in question. This Court further held as under:
12. In the context of the directions given by this Court, shifting the burden of proving on to the appellants that they have a share in the property, it was obligatory on the appellants to have entered the box and discharged the burden by themselves. The question whether the appellants have any independent source of income and have contributed towards the purchase of the property from their own independent income can be only answered by the appellants themselves and not by a mere holder of power of attorney from them. The power-of-attorney holder does not have personal knowledge of the matter of the appellants and therefore he can neither depose on his personal knowledge nor can he be cross-examined on those facts which are to the personal knowledge of the principal.
13. Order 3 Rules 1 and 2 CPC empower the holder of power of attorney to act on behalf of the principal. In our view the word acts employed in Order 3 Rules 1 and 2 CPC confines only to in respect of acts done by the power-of-attorney holder in exercise of power granted by the instrument. The term acts would not include deposing in place and instead of the principal. In other words, if the power-of-
attorney holder has rendered some acts in pursuance of power of attorney, he may depose for the principal in respect of such acts, but he cannot depose for the principal for the acts done by the principal and not by him. Similarly, he cannot depose for the principal in respect of the matter of which only the principal can have a personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is entitled to be cross-examined. This Court further held thus:
17. On the question of power of attorney, the High Courts have divergent views. In the case ofShambhu Dutt Shastri v. State of Rajasthan it was held that a general power-of-attorney holder can appear, plead and act on behalf of the party but he cannot become a witness on behalf of the party. He can only appear in his own capacity. No one can delegate the power to appear in the witness box on behalf of himself. To appear in a witness box is altogether a different act. A general power-of-attorney holder cannot be allowed to appear as a witness on behalf of the plaintiff in the capacity of the plaintiff.
18. The aforesaid judgment was quoted with approval in the case of Ram Prasad v. Hari Narain. It was held that the word acts used in Rule 2 of Order 3 CPC does not include the act of power-of-attorney holder to appear as a witness on behalf of a party. Power-of-attorney holder of a party can appear only as a witness in his personal capacity and whatever knowledge he has about the case he can state on oath but he cannot appear as a witness on behalf of the party in the capacity of that party. If the plaintiff is unable to appear in the court, a commission for recording his evidence may be issued under the relevant provisions of CPC.
19. In the case of Pradeep Mohanbay (Dr.) v. Minguel Carlos Dias the Goa Bench of the Bombay High Court held that a power of attorney can file a complaint under Section 138 but cannot depose on behalf of the complainant. He can only appear as a witness.
20. However, in the case of Humberto Luis v. Floriano Armando Luis on which reliance has been placed by the Tribunal in the present case, the High Court took a dissenting view and held that the provisions contained in Order 3 Rule 2 CPC cannot be construed to disentitle the power-of-attorney holder to depose on behalf of his principal. The High Court further held that the word act appearing in Order 3 Rule 2 CPC takes within its sweep depose . We are unable to agree with this view taken by the Bombay High Court in Floriano Armando.
21. We hold that the view taken by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Shambhu Dutt Shastri followed and reiterated in the case of Ram Prasad is the correct view. The view taken in the case of Floriano Armando Luis cannot be said to have laid down a correct law and is accordingly overruled.
19) As noticed hereinabove, though Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra), relates to powers of Power of Attorney holder under CPC but it was concluded therein that a plaint by a Power of Attorney holder on behalf of the original plaintiff is maintainable provided he has personal knowledge of the transaction in question. In a way, it is an exception to a well settled position that criminal law can be put in motion by anyone [vide Vishwa Mitter (supra)] and under the Statute, one stranger to transaction in question, namely, legal heir etc., can also carry forward the pending criminal complaint or initiate the criminal action if the original complainant dies [Vide Ashwin Nanubhai Yyas v. State of Maharashtra, (1967) 1 SCR 807]. Keeping in mind various situations like inability as a result of sickness, old age or death or staying abroad of the payee or holder in due course to appear and depose before the Court in order to prove the complaint, it is permissible for the Power of Attorney holder or for the legal representative(s) to file a complaint and/or continue with the pending criminal complaint for and on behalf of payee or holder in due course. However, it is expected that such power of attorney holder or legal representative(s) should have knowledge about the transaction in question so as to able to bring on record the truth of the grievance/offence, otherwise, no criminal justice could be achieved in case payee or holder in due course, is unable to sign, appear or depose as complainant due to above quoted reasons. Keeping these aspects in mind, in MMTC (supra), this Court had taken the view that if complaint is filed for and on behalf of payee or holder in due course, that is good enough compliance with Section 142 of N.I. Act.
20) The stand of the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 73 of 2007 is that no complaint can be filed and no cognizance of the complaint can be taken if the complaint is by the power of attorney holder, since it is against Section 200 of the Code and deserves to be rejected. There is no dispute that complaint has to be filed by the complainant as contemplated by Section 200 of the Code, but the said Section does not create any embargo that the attorney holder or legal representative(s) cannot be a complainant.
21) The power of attorney holder is the agent of the grantor. When the grantor authorizes the attorney holder to initiate legal proceedings and the attorney holder accordingly initiates such legal proceedings, he does so as the agent of the grantor and the initiation is by the grantor represented by his attorney holder and not by the attorney holder in his personal capacity. Therefore, where the payee is a proprietary concern, the complaint can be filed by the proprietor of the proprietary concern, describing himself as the sole proprietor of the payee, the proprietary concern, describing itself as a sole proprietary concern, represented by its sole proprietor, and the proprietor or the proprietary concern represented by the attorney holder under a power of attorney executed by the sole proprietor. However, we make it clear that the power of attorney holder cannot file a complaint in his own name as if he was the complainant. In other words, he can initiate criminal proceedings on behalf of the principal.
22) From a conjoint reading of Sections 138142 and 145 of the N.I. Act as well as Section 200 of the Code, it is clear that it is open to the Magistrate to issue process on the basis of the contents of the complaint, documents in support thereof and the affidavit submitted by the complainant in support of the complaint. Once the complainant files an affidavit in support of the complaint before issuance of the process under Section 200 of the Code, it is thereafter open to the Magistrate, if he thinks fit, to call upon the complainant to remain present and to examine him as to the facts contained in the affidavit submitted by the complainant in support of his complaint. However, it is a matter of discretion and the Magistrate is not bound to call upon the complainant to remain present before the Court and to examine him upon oath for taking decision whether or not to issue process on the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. For the purpose of issuing process under Section 200 of the Code, it is open to the Magistrate to rely upon the verification in the form of affidavit filed by the complainant in support of the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. It is only if and where the Magistrate, after considering the complaint under Section 138of the N.I. Act, documents produced in support thereof and the verification in the form of affidavit of the complainant, is of the view that examination of the complainant or his witness(s) is required, the Magistrate may call upon the complainant to remain present before the Court and examine the complainant and/or his witness upon oath for taking a decision whether or not to issue process on the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
23) In the light of the discussion, we are of the view that the power of attorney holder may be allowed to file, appear and depose for the purpose of issue of process for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. An exception to the above is when the power of attorney holder of the complainant does not have a personal knowledge about the transactions then he cannot be examined. However, where the attorney holder of the complainant is in charge of the business of the complainant-payee and the attorney holder alone is personally aware of the transactions, there is no reason why the attorney holder cannot depose as a witness. Nevertheless, an explicit assertion as to the knowledge of the Power of Attorney holder about the transaction in question must be specified in the complaint. On this count, the fourth question becomes infructuous.
24) In view of the discussion, we are of the opinion that the attorney holder cannot file a complaint in his own name as if he was the complainant, but he can initiate criminal proceedings on behalf of his principal. We also reiterate that where the payee is a proprietary concern, the complaint can be filed (i) by the proprietor of the proprietary concern, describing himself as the sole proprietor of the payee ; (ii) the proprietary concern, describing itself as a sole proprietary concern, represented by its sole proprietor; and (iii) the proprietor or the proprietary concern represented by the attorney holder under a power of attorney executed by the sole proprietor.
25) Similar substantial questions were raised in the appeal arising out of S.L.P (Crl.) No. 2724 of 2008, which stand answered as above. Apart from the above questions, one distinct query was raised as to whether a person authorized by a Company or Statute or Institution can delegate powers to their subordinate/others for filing a criminal complaint? The issue raised is in reference to validity of sub-delegation of functions of the power of attorney. We have already clarified to the extent that the attorney holder can sign and file a complaint on behalf of the complainant-payee. However, whether the power of attorney holder will have the power to further delegate the functions to another person will completely depend on the terms of the general power of attorney. As a result, the authority to sub- delegate the functions must be explicitly mentioned in the general power of attorney. Otherwise, the sub-delegation will be inconsistent with the general power of attorney and thereby will be invalid in law. Nevertheless, the general power of attorney itself can be cancelled and be given to another person.
26) While holding that there is no serious conflict between the decisions in MMTC (supra) and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra), we clarify the position and answer the questions in the following manner:
(i) Filing of complaint petition under Section 138 of N.I Act through power of attorney is perfectly legal and competent.
(ii) The Power of Attorney holder can depose and verify on oath before the Court in order to prove the contents of the complaint. However, the power of attorney holder must have witnessed the transaction as an agent of the payee/holder in due course or possess due knowledge regarding the said transactions.
(iii) It is required by the complainant to make specific assertion as to the knowledge of the power of attorney holder in the said transaction explicitly in the complaint and the power of attorney holder who has no knowledge regarding the transactions cannot be examined as a witness in the case.
(iv) In the light of section 145 of N.I Act, it is open to the Magistrate to rely upon the verification in the form of affidavit filed by the complainant in support of the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I Act and the Magistrate is neither mandatorily obliged to call upon the complainant to remain present before the Court, nor to examine the complainant of his witness upon oath for taking the decision whether or not to issue process on the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
(v) The functions under the general power of attorney cannot be delegated to another person without specific clause permitting the same in the power of attorney. Nevertheless, the general power of attorney itself can be cancelled and be given to another person.
27) We answer the reference on the above terms and remit the matter to the appropriate Bench for deciding the case on merits.
6. Record of proceedings shows that revision case is pending from 2011 onwards. The petitioner has obtained stay of the proceedings in STC.No.590 of 2007 and even after this Court ordered private notice, as early as on 09.09.2011, proof has not been filed for effecting service on the respondent. Thus, it is also evident from the above that it is the petitoner, who has proteacted the proceedings in STC No.590 of 2007 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No.I, Tiruppur, and not the respondent.
7. In the light of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated supra, power of attorney can adduce evidence on the facts relating to issuance of cheque, dishonour, issuance of notice and filing of complaint, and these facts can be deposed with documents. He comes into picture, only after all the legal requirements for instituting a complaint, are met and authorised to speak about the abovesaid facts. Power of attorney is given to institute a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and to conduct the case. It cannot be contended that, whatever transpired between the parties is within the personal knowledge of the power of attorney